





















AN AXIOMATIZATION OF MINIMAL CURB SETS 
 























ISSN 0924-7815 An axiomatization of minimal curb sets∗
Mark Voorneveld†,‡,1, Willemien Kets†, and Henk Norde†
†Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
‡Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden
Abstract. Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium
concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in ﬁnite strategic games satisfying existence
is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem:
there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and
recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and
Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept
is axiomatized in this article.
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1. Introduction
The notion of consistency for solutions of noncooperative games was introduced by Peleg and
Tijs (1996) and Peleg et al. (1996). Consistency essentially requires that if a nonempty set of
players commits to playing according to a certain solution, the remaining players in the reduced
game should not have an incentive to deviate from it either. This appears to be a minimal
requirement on a solution concept (see also Aumann, 1987, pp. 478-479): given that others play
the game according to a certain solution, the solution concept should recommend you to do the
same.
Yet, the axiom has a dramatic impact: Norde et al. (1996) proved that the unique point-
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1valued2 solution concept for the set of strategic games satisfying consistency, in combination with
standard utility maximizing behavior in one-player games and nonemptiness, is the Nash equi-
librium concept. In particular, none of the concepts from the extensive equilibrium reﬁnement
literature satisfying nonemptiness is consistent. As Aumann states in an interview (van Damme,
1998, p. 204), this is something to “chalk up against selection theory”. Also Barry O’Neill (2004,
p. 215) calls this a “surprising result” which “seems to challenge the whole project” of equilib-
rium reﬁnement: “It seems hard for reﬁnement advocates to dismiss consistency, since it is so
close to the basic rationale for the Nash equilibrium”.
Dufwenberg et al. (2001) show by means of examples that a transition to set-valued solution
concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued
solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player
games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull (1991) constitute one such a solution
concept. Minimal curb sets are of central importance in the literature on strategic adjustment,
since many intuitively appealing adjustment processes eventually settle down in a minimal curb
set; cf. Hurkens (1995), Young (1998), and Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
Building on the papers cited earlier, which strive for characterizations of existing solution con-
cepts in terms of consistency and other properties or axioms, we provide a similar axiomatization
of minimal curb sets. Section 2 contains deﬁnitions and notation. Section 3 describes properties
of set-valued solution concepts. It is shown that the set-valued solution concept that assigns
to each game its collection of minimal curb sets satisﬁes these properties (Prop. 3.1); indeed,
it is the only one (Thm. 4.1). Moreover, the properties are logically independent (Prop. 4.2).
Section 5 contains variants and extensions of the main result.
2. Notation and deﬁnitions
Weak set inclusion is denoted by ⊆, proper set inclusion by ⊂. A game is a tuple G =
hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni, where N is a nonempty, ﬁnite set of players, each player i ∈ N has a
nonempty, ﬁnite set of pure strategies (or actions) Ai and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function ui : A → R, where A = ×j∈N Aj. The set of all games is denoted by Γ. The subgame
obtained from G by restricting the action set of each player i ∈ N to a subset Xi ⊆ Ai is
denoted — with a minor abuse of notation from restricting the domain of the payoﬀ functions ui
2A point-valued solution concept assigns to each game a collection of strategy proﬁles, i.e., a set of points in
the strategy space of the game. A set-valued solution concept assigns to each game a collection of product sets of
strategies, i.e., a set of product sets in the strategy space of the game. Set-valued solution concepts include: the
set of rationalizable strategies (Bernheim, 1984), persistent retracts (Kalai and Samet, 1984), minimal curb sets
(Basu and Weibull, 1991), and minimal prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004, 2005).
2to ×i∈NXi — by hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni. The set of mixed strategies of player i ∈ N with support
in Xi ⊆ Ai is denoted by ∆(Xi). Payoﬀs are extended to mixed strategies in the usual way. As
usual, (ai,α−i) is the proﬁle of strategies where player i ∈ N plays ai ∈ Ai and his opponents
play according to the mixed strategy proﬁle α−i = (αj)j∈N\{i} ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj). For i ∈ N
and α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj),
BRi(α−i) = arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai,α−i)
is the set of pure best responses of player i against α−i.
A set-valued solution concept ϕ on Γ is a correspondence that assigns to each game G =
hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ a collection ϕ(G) of product sets in A, i.e., each element of ϕ(G) (if
there is any) is a set X = ×i∈NXi with Xi ⊆ Ai for all i ∈ N. We call elements X ∈ ϕ(G)
solutions of G.
A curb set (Basu and Weibull, 1991; ‘curb’ is mnemonic for ‘closed under rational behavior’)
of a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ is a nonempty product set X = ×i∈NXi ⊆ A such that
for each i ∈ N and each belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Xj) of player i, the set Xi contains all best
responses of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Xj) : BRi(α−i) ⊆ Xi.
A curb set X is minimal if no curb set is a proper subset of X. The set-valued solution concept
that assigns to each game its collection of minimal curb sets is denoted by min-curb. Hence, for
each game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ:
min-curb(G) = {X ⊆ A : X is a minimal curb set of G}.
Similarly,
curb(G) = {X ⊆ A : X is a curb set of G}.
We occasionally refer to minimal prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004; ‘prep’ is short for ‘preparation’).
A prep set of G is a nonempty product set X = ×i∈NXi ⊆ A such that for each i ∈ N and each
belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Xj) of player i, the set Xi contains at least one best response of player
i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Xj) : BRi(α−i) ∩ Xi 6= ∅.
A prep set X is minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of X. The set-valued solution concept
that assigns to each game its collection of minimal prep sets is denoted by min-prep. Hence, for
each game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ:
min-prep(G) = {X ⊆ A : X is a minimal prep set of G}.
3Similarly,
prep(G) = {X ⊆ A : X is a prep set of G}.
3. Properties of set-valued solution concepts
We provide properties of set-valued solution concepts and show that min-curb satisﬁes these
properties. Variants are discussed in Section 5. Throughout this section, ϕ is an arbitrary
set-valued solution concept on Γ. The ﬁrst three properties are well-known from Peleg and
Tijs (1996), Peleg et al. (1996), and Norde et al. (1996) for point-valued solutions like the Nash
equilibrium concept and are simply restated for set-valued solution concepts. Nonemptiness
requires that the solution concept assigns to each game a nonempty collection of solutions. One-
person rationality requires that in one-player games, the solution simply consists of the set
of utility maximizers.
Nonemptiness: ϕ(G) 6= ∅ for each G ∈ Γ.
One-person rationality: for each one-player game G = h{i},Ai,uii ∈ Γ it holds
that ϕ(G) = {argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai)}.
The idea behind consistency is that if some players commit to playing according to a certain
solution, the remaining players should have an incentive to do so too. This requires appropriate
ways to model: (a) the reduced game that arises if some players commit to a certain behavior,
(b) the absence of incentives to deviate, i.e., the statement that the solution of the original game
gives rise to a solution of the reduced game.
Diﬀerent models of these issues yield diﬀerent forms of consistency. In this article we use
the notion of reduced games as deﬁned by Peleg and Tijs (1996), Peleg et al. (1996), and Norde
et al. (1996): Given a game G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ with at least two players and a
mixed strategy proﬁle α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Ai), ﬁx a coalition S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅, and suppose that the
players in N \S commit to playing their part of α. The reduced game w.r.t. S and α is the game
GS,α = hS,(Ai)i∈S,(vi)i∈Si ∈ Γ where only players i ∈ S choose from their set of pure strategies
Ai, while their payoﬀ functions reduce to vi : ×j∈SAj → R deﬁned as vi(·) = ui(·,αN\S), i.e., the
payoﬀ in the original game, given that members of N \ S play αN\S = (αj)j∈N\S in accordance
with α.
The next step models the statement that a solution of the original game gives rise to a
solution of the reduced game. Consider a solution X ∈ ϕ(G) of G ∈ Γ. Playing according to
X implies restricting attention to mixed strategy proﬁles α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Xi). Fix some coalition
S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅ of players and suppose that the members of N\S commit to such a strategy proﬁle
4α, thus yielding the reduced game GS,α. Consistency now requires that the initial solution
X ∈ ϕ(G) yields a solution of the reduced game in the following sense: the reduced game GS,α
has a solution in ×j∈SXj, the relevant part of X ∈ ϕ(G).
Consistency: for each G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ, each X = ×i∈NXi ∈ ϕ(G),
each α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Xi), each S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅, there is a solution Y ∈ ϕ(GS,α) with
Y ⊆ ×j∈SXj.
The other properties are speciﬁc for set-valued solution concepts, but remain standard.
Nonnestedness: for each G ∈ Γ, there are no X,Y ∈ ϕ(G) with X ⊂ Y .
Many common set-valued solution concepts satisfy nonnestedness, including those deﬁned by
product sets of actions which: (a) survive some iterated elimination process, for instance of
strictly/weakly dominated actions, or, in the case of rationalizability, of never-best replies, or
(b) are minimal or maximal sets with some desirable property, including persistent retracts (so-
called minimal absorbing retracts, see Kalai and Samet, 1984, pp. 134-135), minimal curb/prep
sets, the product set of all minimax/maximin actions in two-person zero-sum games, the product
set of all rationalizable actions (the so-called maximal tight curb set, see Basu and Weibull, 1991,
p. 145), or the largest consistent set3 of Chwe (1994, pp. 313-318).
The next property, satisfaction, is a simple revealed-preference property. A product set of
strategies is called satisfactory, given the solution concept ϕ, if players can credibly commit to
playing actions from that set if they believe that others do so: it always contains a solution of
the associated reduced game. Given such credible commitment, satisfaction4 states that a way
of ﬁnding solutions of the original game is to solve the subgame restricted to a satisfactory set.
Formally, consider a game G ∈ Γ with at least two players and a product set X = ×i∈NXi ⊆ A.
Such a set is called satisfactory under ϕ if for all α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Xi) and all S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅, there
exists a Y ∈ ϕ(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×j∈SXj.
Satisfaction: for each G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ with |N| ≥ 2 and each X ⊆ A
which is satisfactory under ϕ, one has ϕ(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) ⊆ ϕ(G).
This property is reminiscent of the converse consistency axiom of Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Peleg
et al. (1996), which roughly states that if a solution candidate always yields a solution in the
associated reduced games, it is indeed a solution of the original game. Note that satisfaction
is much weaker: satisfactory sets need not be contained in the solution of the game.
3Chwe’s use of the word ‘consistent’ is unrelated to our notion of consistency.
4The adjective ‘satisfactory’ describes a property of product sets, the noun ‘satisfaction’ describes a property
of a solution concept.
5Proposition 3.1 The set-valued solution concept min-curb satisﬁes nonemptiness, one-per-
son rationality, consistency, nonnestedness, and satisfaction.
Proof. Nonemptiness: Let G ∈ Γ. As the entire strategy space A is a curb set, the collection
of curb sets is nonempty, ﬁnite and partially ordered by set inclusion. Consequently, a minimal
curb set of G exists.
One-person rationality: Let G = h{i},Ai,uii ∈ Γ be a one-player game. In a one-player
game, the set of best responses is simply the set of maximizers of the utility function. Hence,
Xi ⊆ Ai is a curb set of G if and only if argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai) ⊆ Xi; it is a minimal curb set of G
if and only if Xi = argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai). So min-curb(G) = {argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai)}.
Consistency: Let G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ, X = ×i∈NXi ∈ min-curb(G), α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Xi),
and S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. To show: there is a Y ∈ min-curb(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×j∈SXj. Since
X ∈ min-curb(G), it follows that ×j∈SXj ∈ curb(GS,α). Since ×j∈SXj ∈ curb(GS,α) and there
are only ﬁnitely many curb sets in GS,α, it contains a minimal one: there is a Y ∈ min-curb(GS,α)
with Y ⊆ ×j∈SXj.
Nonnestedness: Holds by minimality.
Satisfaction: Let G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ with |N| ≥ 2. Let X ⊆ A be a satisfactory
set under min-curb. To show:
min-curb(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) ⊆ min-curb(G). (1)
We ﬁrst show that X ∈ curb(G). Let i ∈ N and α ∈ ×j∈N∆(Xj). Since X is a sat-
isfactory set under min-curb, there is a Y ∈ min-curb(G{i},α) with Y ⊆ Xi. But G{i},α
is the one-player game h{i},Ai,vii ∈ Γ with vi(ai) = ui(ai,α−i) for all ai ∈ Ai. Hence,
min-curb(G{i},α) = {argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai,α−i)}, so Y = argmaxai∈Ai ui(ai,α−i) ⊆ Xi, i.e., Xi
contains all best replies to the belief α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Xj). Since this holds for arbitrary i ∈ N
and α ∈ ×j∈N∆(Xj), it holds by deﬁnition that X ∈ curb(G). We now prove (1) by contradic-
tion: let Y ∈ min-curb(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni). Since X ∈ curb(G), we also have Y ∈ curb(G).
If Y / ∈ min-curb(G), there is a Z ∈ min-curb(G) with Z ⊂ Y . But since Z ∈ min-curb(G), it is
also a curb set of the subgame G0 = hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni, contradicting that Y ∈ min-curb(G0).
Conclude that (1) holds. 
4. Axiomatization
In this section, we show that min-curb is the unique solution concept satisfying the properties
in Section 3 and that these properties are logically independent.
6Theorem 4.1 The unique set-valued solution concept on Γ satisfying nonemptiness, one-
person rationality, consistency, nonnestedness, and satisfaction is min-curb.
Proof. Proposition 3.1 shows that min-curb satisﬁes the properties. Let ϕ be a set-valued
solution concept on Γ that also satisﬁes them. To show: ϕ(G) = min-curb(G) for all G ∈ Γ.
We do so by induction on the number of players. In a one-player game G = h{i},Ai,uii ∈ Γ, it
follows from one-person rationality of ϕ and min-curb that
ϕ(G) = min-curb(G) = {arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai)}.
Next, let n ∈ N and assume that ϕ and min-curb coincide on all games in Γ with at most n
players. Let G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ have n + 1 players.
Step 1: ϕ(G) ⊆ curb(G).
Let X ∈ ϕ(G),i ∈ N, and α−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Xj). To show: BRi(α−i) ⊆ Xi. Let β ∈
×j∈N∆(Xj) be a mixed strategy proﬁle with β−i = α−i. By consistency of ϕ, there is a
solution Y ∈ ϕ(G{i},β) with Y ⊆ Xi. The game G{i},β is the one-player game h{i},Ai,vii ∈ Γ
with vi(ai) = ui(ai,β−i) = ui(ai,α−i) for all ai ∈ Ai. By one-person rationality of ϕ, it
follows that
ϕ(G{i},β) = {arg max
ai∈Ai
vi(ai)} = {arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai,α−i)},
i.e., the unique solution of the reduced game G{i},β is the set of best replies of i in the game G
against the belief α−i:
Y = arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai,α−i) ⊆ Xi,
as we had to show.
Step 2: If X ∈ min-curb(G), then X is a satisfactory set under ϕ.
Let X ∈ min-curb(G),α ∈ ×i∈N∆(Xi), and S ⊂ N,S 6= ∅. By induction, ϕ(GS,α) =
min-curb(GS,α). By consistency of min-curb, there is a Y ∈ min-curb(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×i∈SXi.
Combining these two results, we ﬁnd that there is a Y ∈ ϕ(GS,α) with Y ⊆ ×i∈SXi. Hence, X
is a satisfactory set under ϕ.
Step 3: If X ∈ min-curb(G), then there is a Y ∈ ϕ(G) with Y ⊆ X.
Let X ∈ min-curb(G). By step 2, X is a satisfactory set under ϕ. Since ϕ satisﬁes non-
emptiness and satisfaction, it follows that
∅ 6= ϕ(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) ⊆ ϕ(G). (2)
So let Y ∈ ϕ(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni). Then Y ⊆ X, and by (2): Y ∈ ϕ(G).
Step 4: ϕ(G) ⊆ min-curb(G).
7Let X ∈ ϕ(G). By step 1, X ∈ curb(G). Suppose X / ∈ min-curb(G): there is a Y ∈
min-curb(G) with Y ⊂ X. By step 3, there is a Z ∈ ϕ(G) with Z ⊆ Y . But since Z ⊆ Y ⊂ X
and X,Z ∈ ϕ(G), we have a contradiction with the assumption that ϕ is nonnested. Conclude
that X ∈ min-curb(G).
Step 5: min-curb(G) ⊆ ϕ(G).
Let X ∈ min-curb(G). By step 3, there is a Y ⊆ X with Y ∈ ϕ(G). By step 1, Y ∈ curb(G).
Since X ∈ min-curb(G) and Y ⊆ X is a curb set, it must be that Y = X, i.e., X = Y ∈ ϕ(G).
Combining steps 4 and 5, conclude that ϕ(G) = min-curb(G) also for the (n + 1)-player
game G. By induction: ϕ(G) = min-curb(G) for all G ∈ Γ. 
Proposition 4.2 The axioms in Theorem 4.1 are logically independent.
We show this by means of ﬁve set-valued solution concepts, each violating exactly one of the
ﬁve axioms in Theorem 4.1. Since the veriﬁcation that these concepts satisfy given properties
proceeds along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3.1, we only show explicitly which axiom









min-curb(G) if G is a one-player game,
{×i∈N{ai} | ∀i ∈ N : ai ∈ Ai} otherwise.
ϕ4(G) =
(




min-curb(G) if G is a one-player game,
{A} otherwise.
The solution concept ϕ1 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 4.1, except nonemptiness: ϕ1(G) =
∅ for each game G ∈ Γ with two or more players.
The solution concept ϕ2 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 4.1, except one-person ratio-
nality: in the one-player game G = h{1},{a,b},u1i with u1(a) = u1(b), we have
ϕ2(G) = min-prep(G) = {{a},{b}} 6= {{a,b}} = {arg max
c∈{a,b}
u1(c)}.
The solution concept ϕ3 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 4.1, except consistency: in the
game G in Figure 1, we have X = {T} × {R} ∈ ϕ3(G). Consider the belief (T,R) in which
8player 1 chooses T with probability one and player 2 chooses R with probability one. In the
reduced game G{1},(T,R) = h{1},{T,B},v1i with v1(T) = v1(B) = 0, we have
ϕ3(G{1},(T,R)) = min-curb(G{1},(T,R)) = {{T,B}},




Figure 1: A simple two-player game G.
The solution concept ϕ4 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 4.1, except nonnestedness:
in the game G in Figure 1, we have ϕ4(G) = curb(G) = {{T} × {L},{T,B} × {L,R}} with
{T} × {L} ⊂ {T,B} × {L,R}.
The solution concept ϕ5 satisﬁes all properties in Theorem 4.1, except satisfaction: in the
two-player game G in Figure 1, {T}×{L} is a satisfactory set under ϕ5, but in the subgame G0
restricted to {T} × {L}, we have ϕ5(G0) = {{T} × {L}} 6⊆ {{T,B} × {L,R}} = ϕ5(G).
5. Variants and extensions
(a) In Theorem 4.1, nonnestedness can be replaced by the following property:
Decisiveness: for each G = hN,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni ∈ Γ and X ∈ ϕ(G):
ϕ(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) = {X}.
The intuition behind decisiveness is that the solution concept takes some argument to its
logical conclusion: given a solution X of a game, the solution of the subgame restricted to X is
not reﬁned further. Note that min-curb satisﬁes decisiveness. Nonnestedness is used only in
step 4 of Theorem 4.1, the proof of which now becomes as follows: Let X ∈ ϕ(G). By step 1, X ∈
curb(G). Let Y ∈ min-curb(G) with Y ⊆ X. Then also Y ∈ min-curb(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni).
By step 3 applied to the subgame hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni, there is a Z ∈ ϕ(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni)
with Z ⊆ Y . Decisiveness of ϕ implies that ϕ(hN,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈Ni) = {X}. Conclude that
X = Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X, i.e., X = Y ∈ min-curb(G), proving step 4.
(b) Since most of the literature on minimal curb sets involves mixed extensions of ﬁnite strategic
games, we took this to be our domain Γ. This ﬁniteness assumption is not necessary: we
9essentially need Γ to be closed w.r.t. certain subgames and reduced games, and that each game
in Γ has a nonempty collection of minimal curb sets. In particular, deﬁning curb sets and the
properties in Section 3 in terms of product sets X = ×i∈NXi where each component Xi is a
nonempty compact set of pure strategies, our analysis carries through also on the domain of
games where each strategy space is assumed to be compact in some Euclidean space and utility
functions are continuous, the domain on which Basu and Weibull (1991) establish existence of
minimal curb sets.
(c) Rationality requires decision makers in one-player games to choose utility maximizing ac-
tions. That is the motivation behind the standard one-person rationality axiom in the
consistency literature. For set-valued solution concepts, it plays a role whether one pools the
utility maximizers within a single set or considers them separately. For instance, in the one-
player game G = h{1},{a,b},u1i with u1(a) = u1(b), we have min-curb(G) = {{a,b}}, whereas
min-prep(G) = {{a},{b}}: curb sets require all ‘best replies’ to be present, prep sets require
the presence of at least one. An intuitive modiﬁcation of the one-person rationality axiom
in Section 3 would therefore be:
For each one-player game G = h{i},Ai,uii ∈ Γ : ϕ(G) = {{bi} : bi ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai)}. (3)
Rewriting our earlier results yields an axiomatization of min-prep:
Theorem 5.1 The unique set-valued solution concept on Γ satisfying nonemptiness, one-
person rationality as in (3), consistency, nonnestedness, and satisfaction is min-prep.
These properties are logically independent.
The proof is virtually identical to that of Propositions 3.1, 4.2, and Theorem 4.1 by interchanging,
ﬁrstly, curb and prep and, secondly, min-curb and min-prep. It is therefore omitted.
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